

THE SARTOR FAQIR
LIFE AND STRUGGLE
AGAINST
BRITISH IMPERIALISM

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Sa'dullah Khan (Sa'd Allah Khan) known as '*Sartor¹ Faqir*' was member of a honourable family of Buner.² He is also known as *Mullah* (Mulla) *Mastan*,³ *Sartor Baba*, *Faqir Baba*, to the British as the '*Mad Mullah*⁴ and *mad Faqir*. By birth he was the son of a Bunerwal Malik⁵ Hameedullah and an inhabitant of village Rega Buner.⁶ He belonged to the Abazai, a branch of the Nuriza'i which is a sub-branch of the Yusufza'i Maliza'i.⁷

Details about his early life are sketchy. It is said that he was a great wrestler and an athlete in his youth⁸. From childhood he took up travelling to various areas in search of religious education and for a period stayed also in Ajmir (India).⁹ But according to McMahon and Ramsay "owing to a quarrel with his brother in which he is said to have killed him (some say accidentally) he hurriedly left Buner and went to India. He lived for some years in Ajmir and other places in India."¹⁰ He further travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's Chief Cantonment in Afghan Turkistan. He is said to have lived there for ten years and then to have gone to Kabul.¹¹ He returned to Buner in 1895¹² where he had tried to stir up a *Jihad*, but, without success.¹³

Nevertheless, his piety soon made him widely known in the Swat and Indus Kohistan, and his religious fervour earned him his title of *Mastan*.¹⁴ To his single-mindedness of purpose, impatience of political intrigue, and to his fanaticism against the British Government his name of *Mullah Mastan* (mad *Mullah*) is due.¹⁵ H. Woosnam Mills compares him to Peter the Hermit¹⁶ in perseverance and assiduity which are the 'characteristics of the frontier fanatics'. He is said to 'have liberally spread his doctrines of murder and rapine amongst the tribesmen'¹⁷ against the British forces and their allies and supporters.

In the summer of 1897 the *Sartor Faqir* visited Bajour, the Uthman Khel country, and Buner, preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. He is supposed to have been in league with Hajab-ud-din (Hajab al-Din), the notorious (from British point of view) *Mullah* of Hadda, whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was well known.¹⁸ He appeared in Upper Swat in July (1897) and the fame of his preaching spread far and wide.¹⁹ Impatient at the failure of the other leaders to start *Jihad*, the *Sartor Faqir* determined to do so himself.²⁰ Intense emotions were rising against the Imperial Power and "the time was one of great unrest in Swat and elsewhere on the border".²¹ The *Faqir* took up his abode at Landakai. A folk verse states:

پہ لنداکی ورتہ دیرہ سرتور فقیر دے
دینگ فرنگے دخان پہ ویر دے

Sartor Faqir has taken abode, for them; at Landakai

Ding²² (Deane) Ferangay is mourning himself.

Here at Landakai he said that "he had been sent by someone but would not say who; also that four other leaders were coming to join him."²³ Here he also obtained the reputation of having miraculous powers".²⁴ Churchill writes in his first hand account:

As July advanced the Bazaar at Malakand became full of tales of the Mad Fakir. A great day for Islam was at hand. A mighty man had arisen to lead them. The English would be swept away. By the times of

the new moon, not one would remain.²⁵

He proclaimed that he had an invisible army from heaven at his side to assist him. He professed to have the power of making himself invisible and feeding multitudes with a few grains of rice.²⁶ H. Woosnam Mills writes:

Further stories stated that he was in possession of a species of widow's cruse from which he fed all his hosts. There is little doubt that by some trickery he managed to impose on many of his subsequent followers, for the tale was told and believed that the Malik of one of the villages sent him a gift of Rs. 50, which was returned with Rs. 50 more in addition and the message that the *fakir* required no money, as God produced all his requirement. Among a people so credulous such stories were readily believed.²⁷

But according to McMahon and Ramsay the *Faqir* "on first starting was well supplied with funds."²⁸ May be from Afghanistan and India. The *Faqir's* travelling to India and Afghanistan and staying there for some years indicate that he may have had contacts with the Indian *Mujahideen* (followers of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid Breillavi) and with the Amir of Afghanistan. The Indian contact is evident in the person of his second-in-command "who is said to have been a mullah from India"²⁹ and the Afghan factor by the publication of a book on *jihad* named *Tarhib-al-jihdd*³⁰ by the Amir of Afghanistan.

Furthermore it is said that besides supernatural and unseen support he had magical power too.³¹ About the 20th and 21st (July 1897) the *Faqir* began giving out that he had heavenly hosts with him, that his mission was to turn the British off the Malakand and out of Peshawar, as their (British) rule of 60 years there was up. He claimed to have been visited by all the deceased *faqirs*, who told him that the mouths of their (British) guns and rifles would be closed and that their (British troops) bullets would be turned to water; that he had only to throw stones into the Swat river, and each stone he threw would have on them (British troop) the effect of a gun.³²

In spite of all the prevailing excitements and developments *Sartor Faqir* "was regarded by the headmen of the country as a mad man"³³ and the Thana Khan Khel headmen, who were consulted on the subject said on the 25th (July 1897) to Major Deane (Political Agent) that no importance need be attached to his proceedings. The Mianguls³⁴ also professed to ignore him, and said they would send a servant to remove him.³⁶ Nevertheless "the native mind was impressed by the extraordinary stories, and the more improbable they were the wider was the degree of popularity extended to them".³⁶ He was popularly believed to have vast armies hidden in the hills, which at the proper moment would be launched forth against the *Sirkar* (*sarkar*, government). Local people talked of nothing else for days in the Malakand Bazar but of magnificent cavalry, artillery and infantry which were at the holy man's (*Sartor Faqir's*) disposal, and on one ventured near the hilly neighbourhood where this army lay concealed, strict orders to that effect having, it was stated, been issued by the *Faqir* himself.³⁷

On 26th July 1897 the *Sartor Faqir* started down the valley from Landakai³⁸ 'followed only by a few boys, one of whom he proclaimed King of Delhi.'³⁹ He had raised a red crescent standard.⁴⁰

He announced that with or without help from his listeners he would sweep the British troops from Chakdara and the Malakand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism which exists in every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous.⁴¹ The people, amazed at his boldness, and overcome by superstitious fears of his powers, joined him as he proceeded.⁴²

His progress from Landakai to Thana and thence to Aladand, both villages within the views of Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one; the villagers flew to arms. British levies hastily retired, except such as joined his standard. All the headmen, with one solitary exception, were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a resolute body of tribesmen was on the move to attack Malakand while another party turned its attention to Chakdara⁴³. A hurried warning was brought in to Major Deane by a Levy *jamedar* (*jama'dar*) who galloped in with the news at 9:15 p.m. that the tribesmen were approaching Malakand.⁴⁴

Due to the aforesaid developments and circumstances, towards the end of July, 1897, the gravity of the situation could no longer be ignored, and it was considered necessary to warn the (British) troops stationed in the neighbourhood to hold themselves in readiness for action at the shortest notice.⁴⁵ So the alarm was sounded and the (British) troops had barely time to go for their arms before the attack commenced.⁴⁶ The *Faqir* with his followers made a sudden attack on Malakand and Chakdara simultaneously.⁴⁷ He had roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rallying point for thousands of fighting men from Upper Swat, Buner, the Utmankhel country and even more distant parts.⁴⁸ The tribesmen who on the first night had barely exceeded 1000 (men), increased in numbers with incredible rapidity to some 12000 or more at Malakand, while upwards of 8000 (men) at Chakdara.⁴⁹

For the British on July 26 (1897) the situation assumed so grave an aspect that the Guides were summoned from Mardan⁵⁰ before the tribesmen could attack and they arrived at Malakand after their famous march the other day on 27th July 1897, By 28th the mobilisation of the troops in India was ordered and some of them were even then on their way.⁵¹ On the 30th July the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras arrived,⁵² and "the 31st was marked by the arrival of more troop."⁵³

The tribesmen were so confident of their success that they had done no damage to the bridge over the river, and had abstained from firing on the horses and mules within the defensive area, though these had been exposed to fire throughout.⁵⁴ In the actual contest "the Fakir who, to do him justice, showed himself a brave man, was severely wounded in the hand"⁵⁵ and lost his right-hand forefinger.⁵⁶ His second-in-command and companion, a Mullah from India⁵⁷ was killed.⁵⁸ Heavy fighting continued at both places, until Malakand was relieved on August 1st and Chakdara on the 2nd.⁵⁹ The Mad *Mulla* and his warriors disappeared as quickly and as strangely as they had come, leaving behind them several hundred of their own and British dead.⁶⁰ The attempt of *Sartor Faqir*, to oust the English from Malakand and Chakdara, was not foiled simply by the gallantry, dauntless courage or bravery of the Imperial forces as H. Woosman Mills use these words time and again in their respect⁶¹ The failure of *the jihad*⁶² was inter-alia due to the absence of pre-planning for a long drawn war, shortage of supplies, the *Faqir's* false claims of victory before coming in sight of the new moon, no discipline and organization in the *Faqir's* warriors' ranks. Moreover, the *Faqir's* precipitation of matters,

unacquaintance of the tribesmen with the strategy of a long drawn war and last but not the least on British side it was "a fresh victory of organization over sheer mass power."⁶³

Although the *Faqir* retired from Malakand and his followers dispersed he did not give up his mission. The Political Officer reported that the Mad Mullah' tried to raise Shanazai (Shamozai) villages north-east of Chakdara on the night of the 5th (August 1837) but failed.⁶⁴ When the Chitral relief took place in May 1898 the *Faqir*, thinking the moment a favourable one, tried to get into Dir to make an attack on them, but his messengers were turned back by the tribesmen.⁶⁵ In July 1898 "persistent reports" came in that the *Faqir* was trying to raise another *jihad*, but the clans in Swat refused to give him passage.⁶⁶

In November 1898 the Swat tribes on the right bank of the Swat river, incensed at various acts of interference in their affairs by the *Nawwab* of Dir, appealed to the Mad *Faqir* who crossed the river on the 25th November and espoused their cause against the *Nawwab*. Numbers flocked to his standard, and he started off to attack Dir⁶⁷ and then with the support, as he hoped, of Dir tribes to again attack the Malakand.⁶⁸ The *Faqir* advanced on the 30th November, reports McMahan and Ramsay, to the crest of the watershed of the Panjkora river at the head of the Nikbi Khel (Nikpi Khel) valley, and another march would have brought him into the road between Chakdara and Dir. The immediate effect of this would have been to bring the Dir tribes to his side, and the English could have had to face another general rising like that of 1897. The moment was a critical one. (However), for some unknown reason the *Faqir* delayed an immediate advance.⁶⁹

Due to the *Faqir's* delay and hesitation of the *Nawwab* of Dir to move against him 'Abdullah Khan ('Abd Allah Khan) of Robat with some 1200 men advanced over the hills and attacked the *Faqir's* forces, who retreated towards the Swat River. This changed in a moment the whole aspect of the war, and instead of a general *jihad* against the infidel, the affair became one of Muhammadan against Muhammadan, and not only committed the Dir tribes concerned against the *Faqir*, but dispelled the belief that no tribesman would dare to oppose him.⁷⁰ This unexpected opposition by the Dir tribes under 'Abdullah Khan of Robat upset his (the *Faqir's*) plan, and the presence of a moveable column in the Swat valley and their movement up the valley (to Haibatgram near Landakai) forced him to abandon the attempt and again retire to Kohistan.⁷¹

To prevent the *Faqir's* further attempts, agreements were executed between the *Nawwab* of Dir, the tribes on the right bank of river Swat and the British Government. The tribes of Shamizai, Sebjuni, Nikpi Khel and Shamozai promised never again to allow the *Faqir* or other enemy of the *Nawwab* or Government to enter their country.⁷² The Government entered into understanding and agreements with other tribes on the left bank of river Swat and the 'Mianguls'⁷³ to counter the *Faqir's* influence and block his way of further rousing the masses.

Thus by adopting the policy of 'divide and rule' the British Government constrained the *Faqir* to make terms with it. So, in 1900 AD. he made friendly advances to the Political Agent of Malakand, through one of his leading adherents. These advances were received in a friendly spirit, and the *Faqir* volunteered the promise that he would abstain from any further acts of hostility to the British Government.⁷⁴ The British Government,

claimed the *Faqir's* grand son Humayun, offered him the *Nawwabi* (ruler ship) of Swat but he rejected.

Any how according to McMahon and Ramsay, the exchange of messages and presents between him and the Political Agent became widely known in the country, and the result had naturally been that the *Faqir's* influence had visibly declined. He and his principal adherents were accused of being in receipt of Government pay, and their denials were not believed by those who claimed a share in his profits. It was hard to say whether the *Faqir* had been more discredited by the unfounded belief in his receiving Government pay, or by his persistence denials of it.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, he did not remain hidden, underground and nor did practically gave up his mission. But some years later, the *Sartor Faqir*, induced by Afghans, prepared for another raid — on 9th May 1908 Gul Shahzada Miangul (who of late years had become very friendly and even received the Political Agent as a guest in his sanctuary at Saidu) sent word that he had "heard that the *Faqir* had reached Azzi Khel country with his *lashkars* and expressed his willingness to do anything that was required in the matter. Swat was of course instantly alive with excitement.⁷⁶ However, he next departed northwards, sending, as a parthian shot at Gul Shahzada, a sealed letter to the Political Agent stating that he had been forbidden to go on by Naqshband Khan, and that it was for his sake and not the MianguTs that he had given up his plans.⁷⁷ .

The Political Agent records in his diary that the *Faqir* "severely beat a messenger of Gul Shahzada Miangul Wadood, it seems possible that more will be heard of it, because the last claim which the Minagul's best friends make for them would be that they have forgiving tempers."⁷⁸ However, his advancing age was against him and the *Faqir*, already an old man at the turn of the century, saw his following break up after the failure of the movement and as a result of his incapacity to live up to his magical exploits and exaggerated promises.⁷⁹

Besides his attempts against the Imperial power, *Sartor Faqir* went from place to place and after the unsuccessful attempt of 1897 he "Teturneti to the Indus" Kohistan⁸⁵ and lived for some time at Miandam near Paitai⁸¹ (Now Fatehpur). Later on he settled, permanently, in Paitai and married the daughter of Abdur Rahim ('Abd al-Rahim). Wherever he went, claims Habib-ur-Rahman and Humayun, land and daughters were bestowed on him by the people.⁸² When he left the place he left the wife with the land and children (if any) there. His other marriages were before his permanent settlement at Fatehpur.

The last Wali of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb, states that "he was just that: a mad *Mullah*. He had no descendants, he had no tribe."⁸³ It seems that the last Wali of Swat has tried to distort facts about the *Sartor Faqir*. About his madness McMahon and Ramsay admit that "the Fakir so far from mad was a man of some acuteness."⁸⁴ About his descendants Roshan Khan writes that he left behind four daughters and a four years' son named 'Umara Khan (died in 1988).⁸⁵ Apart from his descendants in Fatehpur (Swat) he had four sons, Azad "Khan, 'Abdullah ('Abd Allah), Muhibullah (Muhib Allah) and Mir Afdal, in village Rega (Buner). Azad Khan migrated to Swat and settled in Satal near Bahrain. 'Abdullah died in the *Faqir's* lifetime and the other two remained in Riga. He had another son Amir Faqir in Kanra (Ghwarband) and a daughter Bacha Zarina in

Besham.⁸⁶ As far as his tribe is concerned, he belonged to Abazai, a branch of Nurizai which is a sub-branch of Yusufzai Malizai.⁸⁷ Further more he was not a commoner but "the son of a Bunerwal Malik."⁸⁸

In response to some queries Habib-ur-Rahman of Fatehpur (Swat) told that the *Faqir* used to receive sacks of rupees, from Dir and Afghanistan, as *shukranay* (lit. gratitudes) from his adherents; but he used to distribute these to the needful, the poor and the youth. His household people were in receipt of these *shukranay* in his absence. He used to feed his visitors. He did not care for *khans* and *maliks* but occupied himself with the masses, preached them not to shoot and kill each other. He died as an octogenarian in 1336 A.H.⁸⁹ (1917 A.D.) in Fatehpur and was buried there.

It may be concluded that the main task, mission and objective of the *Sartor Faqir* was to wage *jihads* and eliminate the British Imperialists from the North Western Frontier region of India. He made several attempts but failed mainly due to his precipitation of matters and unplanned acts, his own old age, the British agreements and arrangements with the various tribes, *khans* and *Nawwab* of Dir, and their supremacy in arms, ammunition, communication system and trained and regular disciplined army and also due to "the changed attitude of the British to the Miangul (Abdul Wadood) and his strategy."⁹⁰ Nevertheless McMahan and Ramsay admit that "the Sartor Fakir provided some of the hardest and sternest fighting we have known on the North-Western Frontiers."⁹¹ It may be said that his movement kept the urge for freedom *and jihad* alive among the hardy warriors of this region.

NOTES and REFERENCES

1. 'Sartor' means bare headed. "Implying one who is either too poor, too demented or too ecstatic to cover his head". See Akbar S Ahmed. Millennium and Charisma among Pathans, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. London 1976, p. 153. Henceforth Akbar S. Ahmed. As he did not wear a turban or cap etc. therefore he became famous as the Sartor Faqir. It is also said that sartor literally means "black head" See also Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial series, N.W.F.P. Sang-e-Meel publications, Lahore, reprint 1979, p. 221, henceforth I.G.I. Though (in Pashto) 'tor' (ټور) means "black' but sartor (سرتور) means bare headed' not 'black head'.
2. Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, Yusufzai Afghan (Urdu), Muhammad 'Ali Educational Society, Karachi, 1960, p. 618. Henceforth Allah Bakhsh Yusufi'.
3. Mast means a person having a form of ecstasy or trance-like state (Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 152). Probably due to the use of the word mastan the English had given him the name of the 'Mad Mullah' (Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, op. cit., p. 618). Whether the English, writers mistook mastan tor mad or they had done so intentionally is not clear but mastan does not mean 'mad'. Whenever he went to the people, says his grandson, Humayun, in his campaign of preaching jihad they said sarcastically that 'he is mad' (دے لیونے دے) so he became known as the Liwanay (mad) Faqir.
According to M. Shafi' Sabir "The English were so averse to Mastan Mullah that they have had mentioned him as the Mad Mullah every where in their writings. Muhammad Shafi' Sabir, Tarikh-i-Subah Sarhad, Urdu, University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1986, p. 175. Henceforth M. Shafi" Sabir.
4. James W. Spain, The way of the Pathans, Oxford University Press Karachi, 1979, p. 67. Henceforth James W. Spain.

5. I.G.I, op. cit., p. 221.
6. Roshan Khan, *Yusufuzai Qawm ki Sarguzasht*, Urdu, Roshan Khan & Co. Karachi, 1986, p. 319. Henceforth Roshan Khan'.
7. Ibid. Also, Saranzeb Khan Swati, *Tarikh-i-Riyast-i-Swat*, Pashto, 'Azeem Publishing House, Peshawar, 1984, p. 96. Henceforth Saranzeb Khan Swati.
8. A-H. McMahon and A.D.G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour together with the Utmankhel and Sam Ranizai*, Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, reprint 1981, p. 27. Henceforth McMahon and Ramsay.
9. Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, op. cit., p. 618. It is noteworthy that his grandsons Mu'amber Khan and Humiyun are of different opinion about his acquiring religious education. Madar Khan, a grandson of the Faqir's brother, is also of the opinion that he did not acquire any education.
10. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 27. In response to a query, in this respect, this writer was told by Madar Khan, a grandson of the Sartor Faqir's brother Zaidullah Khan (Zayd Allah Khan) in village Rega on September 6, 1992 (in presence of aged persons) that it was his brother 'Zardar Babi' by whose fist a cousin (not a brother.) .was killed accidentally not by that of "Sartor Baba:. As a result of this they were made sharunkai (exiled) from Rega, according to the customs, for some years.
11. H. Woosnam Mills, *The Pathan Revolts in North West India*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, reprint 1979, p. 34. Henceforth "H. Woosnam Mills'. C.f M. Shafi' Sabir, op. cit. various sources give different versions about his travelling abroad before 1895. They mention either India or Afghanistan. It seems that he first went to India, whether due to a quarrel or in search of religious education, and later on to Afghanistan.
12. I.G.I. op. cit., p. 221.
13. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 109. It has been confirmed in Rega on September 6, 1992 that he had tried, in Buner, to rouse the people and stir up a jihad against the English.
14. I.G.I, op. cit., p. 221. For 'Mastan, see f.n. 3 above.
15. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 27 see also f.n. 3 above.
16. 'Peter the Hermit' was a priest of Amiens; born about 1050 A.O. Many fictitious stories have been given of his early life. He was an emotional revivalist preacher and one of the preachers of the First Crusade in France. He died on July 8, 11-15 A.D. For details see *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1953, vol. 17, p. 654 and *Encyclopaedia Americana*, 1956, vol. 21, p. 661.
17. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit., p. 34.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
20. McMahon and Ramsay, op: cit., p. 27.
21. Ibid.
22. Major Deane: Political Agent of Malakand at the time, Olaf Caroe writes: "The Tribes knew him to be utterly fearless, firm, honest and resolute" (Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1976, p. 422). He is still known as 'Ding' instead of 'Deane'.
23. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 109. In response to the query that why he left Buner and started the jihad campaign, Humavun told, this writer on July 25th, 1992, that four (legendary) persons (faqirs) came to him in dream, put their hands on his back and told him to rise up for the jihad. Thus he started his jihad mission on those faqir's inspiration. In response to the same query Madar Khan told, in Rega (Buner), that he came (accidentally) on a meeting of the (legendary) faqirs in the graveyard of Sonigram (Buner). They welcomed him and told him that they would pray for him if he could take responsibility of the Malakand. They prayed for him, he took the responsibility and started the jihad.
24. Ibid, p. 27.
25. Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 108.
26. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 109.
27. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit, p. 36.

28. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 112.'
29. Ibid., p. 111.
30. Ibid., p. 108.
31. Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 108.
32. Pp. Enclosure 28, dated 8 August 1897, Quoted in Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 108. Many other miracles and magical power of the Sartor Faqir are mentioned and believed in by the ignorant e.g. Habib-ur-Rehman of Fatehpur, being a teenager in 1897 and now in good mental and physical conditions, told that in the Malakand jihad Faqir Baba ordered the people to throw sand towards the enemy. When they did so the sand became hornets (against the English). Moreover, that at the jihad time he planted his stick in the river and ordered the people to cross the river. They closed their eyes, and when they opened their eyes they found themselves on the other side. That once a raft overturned with his servant Ubaidullah (Ubayd Allah) in the river Swat. Peoples told the Faqir Baba that Ubaidullah has been drowned but he replied 'don't worry he is my (he used to call Ubaidullah chamnay). The river cannot harm him" and Ubaidullah came out safe and sound near Shand (about three miles from Fatehpur). But in response to a query that how did Faqir BabI himself crossed the river, whenever he wanted to go to the other side of the river, Habib-ur-Rahman replied that he had to use raft for crossing the river (he did not fly over it nor planted a stick for himself). So many other superstitious stories, of him, were also told to this writer in the village Rega Buner

پیرنہ الوخی خومریدان بی الوخی

Though the pir himself does not fly his disciples would have him fly (ibid., p. 103).

33. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 109.
34. Grandsons, of the Akhund of Swat and influential and power ambitious figures (for Akhund of Swat please see J.P.H.S. vol. XL July 1992, pp. 299-308).
35. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., pp. 109, 110. Also see Akbar S. Ahmed op. cit., p. 109.
36. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit., p. 36.
37. Ibid.
38. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 110.
39. I.G.I., op. cit., p. 23.
40. M. Shaf Sabir, op. cit., p. 711.
41. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit, p. 35.
42. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 110.
43. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit, p. 35.
44. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 110.
45. Captain H.L. Nevill, Campaigns on the North West Frontier, Sang-e-Meel publications, Lahore, Reprint 1977, p. 223, henceforth H.L. Nevill'.
46. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 110.
47. I.G.I., op, cit, p. 23.
48. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit, p. 35.
49. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 111
50. H.L. Nevill, op. cit, p. 225.
51. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 111.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. H.L. Nevill, op. cit, p. 230.
55. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 111.
56. According to M. Shafi' Sabir "his two fingers were cut (p. 715) whereas his elder grandson Mu'amber Khan/in Fatehpur) and Madar Khan (his brother's grandson in Rega) says that he lost his right hand forefinger only.
57. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 111.

58. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit, p. 51.
59. I.G.I., op. cit, p. 23.
60. James W. Spain, op. cit, p. 67.
61. H. Woosnam Mills may be justified for writing such, because "to be biased in favour of our own community or the communities which are of the same religion or race, or which are allied with us against our enemies, is not something that is within our own will" (Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, translated and edited by Niyazi Berks, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1959, p. 113) and the stone "is the only thing that may be described truthfully as unbiased" (Ghani Khan, The Pathans, Pushto Adabi Society Islamabad, reprint 1990, p. 50).
- Nevertheless the other side too possessed and showed gallantry, dauntless courage and resoluteness. An English writer states in the account of 1895 campaign that "it was impossible not to admire the courage displayed by the enemy (at Malakand); who exposed themselves most recklessly" (H.C. Thomson, The Chitral Campaign, Sang-e-Meel publications, Lahore reprint, 1981, p. 173). H. Woosnam Mills himself admit that "their overweening confidence in the Mad Fakir' is amply testified by the undaunted way in which they rallied to the attack time and again, spite of the terrible losses inflicted on them by the old smoothbore and the Maxims (p. 63)" and "the Fakir so far from being mad was a man of some-acuteness" (McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 112).
62. The jihads in the colonial encounters of the nineteenth century were the last grand and futile gesture of the 'traditionalists' forces of Islam fighting against the most powerful nations on earth. "The inevitability of the outcome merely underlines the conceptualization of the rationale contained in the jihad by its participants: The struggle is more important than victory; the principal more important than the objective" (Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit, p. 93). As a result of the 1897 jihad The task of punishment and prevention of further combination was taken in hand at once" (I.G.I., op. cit, p. 23) and the British forces went up to Gulibagh in the upper Swat. But even then the English Government did not dare to occupy these tribal territories permanently. They remained contented upon treaties with the tribal (Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, Pukhtana Da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kae , Pashto, University Book Agency, Peshawar, p. 1147).
63. As Prof. Joseph Hall has rightly remarked about the victory of Muslims, over the non-Muslims confederates, in the Battle of Ditch (5 A.H/627 A.D.) vide Mazhar-ul-Haq, A short History of Islam, Bookland, Lahore, 1988, pp. 80,81.
64. H. Woosnam Mills, op. cit., p. 74.
65. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 119.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., p. 120.
68. Ibid., p. 28.
69. Ibid., pp. 120, 121. On the British side "good reasons for anxiety on this occasion is proved by the admissions of members of the Swat tribes, even those of Lower Swat and Ranizai, who say that had the Fakir succeeded in gaining headway They would have been bound to follow him" (Ibid., p. 121).
70. Ibid., p. 121.
71. Ibid., p. 28.
72. Ibid., p. 122.
73. It is noteworthy that the reputation, influence, fame and popularity of the Sartor Faqir had become a challenge for the Mianguls; who had to exploit the spiritual ascendancy of their grandfather, 'The Akhund of Swat' (Saidu Baba). Therefore, they did not cooperate with the Faqir in his mission and tried to create hurdles for him and block his way or turn him out of Swat. According to Nasrullah Khan Nasr "in 1897 Miangul Badshah Sahib 'Abdul Wadood and the Sartor Faqir (Mullah Mastan) declared jihad against the English" (Nasrullah Khan

Nasr, Akhund Sahib-i-SwatyPashto, Dar-ul-Tasnif, Peshawar, 1964, p. 75). May it had been so but the facts were not such. How and why the Mianguls joined the Jihad too late on 29th July. In this respect Miangul Jahanzeb states: "My father and his cousins also joined the jihad — my father did not actually do any thing, he stayed behind the lines; but he felt compelled by the people to join, or else he would have been declared an infidel or something" (Fradrik Barth, *The Last Wall of Swat*, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1985, p. 22. Henceforth *The Last Waif of Swat*).

74. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 127.
75. Ibid., pp. 127, 128.
76. P.A.'s Diary, 16 May 1908, p. 66; quoted in Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit, p. 110.
77. P.A.'s Diary, 24 May 1908, p. 66; quoted in Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 110. Cf. *The Last Wad of Swat*, op. cit., p. 27.
78. P.A.'s Diary, 31 May 1908, p. 83; quoted in Akbar. S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 110.
79. Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 116.
80. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit., p. 28.
81. Ibid.
82. Madar Khan, grandson of the Faqir's brother, also told the same.
83. *The Last Waif of Swat*, op. cit, p. 22.
84. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 112.
85. Roshan Khan, op. cit, p. 319.
86. It is not clear that how many sons and daughters the Sartor Faqir had in fact, because he married at various places and left those wives there. However, this author tried to make it clear and tried to confirm the names and places of these few, aforementioned, in Fatehpur (Swat) and Rega (Buner). Though they are dead now; their descendants are still alive in their respective villages.
The *Wali' has ignored even the Faqir's son, Amir Faqir, who, being a low rank officer in his army, was known to the Wali. He has also ignored Umara Khan (d. 1988) who was alive, in Fatehpur, at the time of the Wali's dictation of his autobiography to Fredrik Barth. According to the Wali "the other essential thing is knowing all the facts about people" (p. 121) and after giving an example himself admits that "in general I know the families better than their own youngsters do. Even outside the State"(p. 121).
Therefore, it seems that being a rival to their dynastic power, influence and interests in his life time; the Wali, Miangul Jahanzeb, has distorted facts about the Sartor Faqir. It is also interesting to note that in his father's, Miangul Abdul Wadood's; autobiography the Faqir has not been mentioned anywhere, even once. Please see f.n. 73 above.
87. Roshan Khan, op. cit, p. 319 see also 'Saranzeb Khan Swati', op. cit, p. 96. Also confirmed it personally.
88. See MacMahon and Ramsay, up. vit., pp. 22,27; Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, op. cit., p. 618; I.G.I." op. cit, p. 221.
89. Cemented by his son Umara Khan, August 12, 1957, The Faqir's tomb bears his death year (1336 A.H.). As his date of birth is not known, therefore, his proper age is uncertain. However, Habib-ur-Rehman told that he died between eighty to hundred years of age.
90. Akbar S. Ahmed, op. cit, p. 110.
91. McMahon and Ramsay, op. cit, p. 28.